Category Archives: Philosophy

Where did wokeness come from?

Article by Patrick West, a review of a new book (Taboo: How Making Race Sacred Produced a Cultural Revolution), by Eric Kaufmann.

Excerpts:

Important, too, was the language and thinking of psychology and therapy. These helped shape the idea that minorities need protection from hurtful words that might cause trauma and damage to people’s self-esteem. Kaufmann calls this shift in the mid-1960s, from cultural liberalism to cultural socialism, ‘the big bang of our moral universe, from which taboos around sexism, homophobia, and transphobia were to later spring’. He continues: ‘While radical ideas like critical race theory or gender ideology have gained ground, they only succeeded because they resonated with an established left-liberal hypersensitivity around identity issues.’

It’s here to stay, too, he says. As I write these words, two news stories suggest Kaufmann is right. In one, a British university is decolonising its course on Medieval history to excise the word ‘Anglo-Saxon’; in the other, the Bank of England is telling its staff to use ‘gender neutral’ pronouns when addressing colleagues.

There may have been some pushback against this ideology in recent years, especially when it comes to trans. But Kaufmann is not persuaded that we are approaching the ‘end of woke’. He believes woke tenets are now firmly entrenched in our society, particularly in the minds of tomorrow’s rulers, educators, policymakers, advertising executives and so on. As a middle-aged man, Kaufmann seeks to put it as delicately as possible, but he cannot refrain ultimately from calling out those who he deemed to be the most fervent custodians of our new morality: namely, young, middle-class, highly educated women.

Some might see a contradiction here: is woke imposed on people, or do converts embrace it willingly? Yet it needn’t be an ‘either / or’ matter. Undoubtedly, it spreads through both force and people’s own volition. Those who embrace it think they are being virtuous. Those who would resist often acquiesce, fearing the consequences of doing or saying the wrong thing.

That’s why overcoming woke will take far more than a few laws or a change of government. It will involve rethinking what we mean by ‘caring’ and ‘uncaring’. It will involve daring to be regarded in public as ‘bad people’. It will mean we cannot shy away from the culture war.

What Ludwig von Mises Meant by “Democracy”

Article by Ryan McMaken.

Excerpt:

“Democracy” is one of those terms that is essentially useless unless the one using the word first defines his terms. After all, the term “democratic” can mean anything from small-scale direct democracy to the mega-elections we see in today’s huge constitutional states. Among the modern social-democratic Left, the term often just means “something I like.”

The meaning of the term can also vary significantly from time to time and from place to place. During the Jacksonian period, the Democratic party—which at the time was the decentralist, free-market, Jeffersonian party—was called “the Democracy.” By the mid twentieth century, the term meant something else entirely. In Europe, the term came to take on a variety of different meanings from place to place.

For our purposes here, I want to focus on how one particular European—Ludwig von Mises—used the term.

Although many modern students of Mises are often highly skeptical of democracy of various types, it is clear that Mises himself used the term with approval. But, Mises used the word in a way that was quite different from how most use it today. The Misesian view contrasts with modern conceptions of a “democracy” in which majority rule is forcibly imposed upon the whole population. Because modern democratic states exercise monopolistic power over their populations, there is then no escape from this “will of the majority.”

Misesian democracy is something else altogether.

Mises’s vision of democracy must be understood in light of his support for unlimited secession as a tool against majoritarian rule. For Mises, “democracy” means the free exercise of a right of exit, by which the alleged “will of the majority” is rendered unenforceable against those who seek to leave.

Continue reading here.

The Fatal Conceit

That’s the title of Friedrich Hayek’s final book (published 1988).

According to the Wikipedia page of the book, the title drives “from a passage in Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), though the exact phrase does not occur in Smith’s book.”

Here is that Adam-Smith quote, according to Wikipedia:

‘The man of system … is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it. … He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces on a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces on the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse [choose] to impress upon it.’ Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1984, VI.ii.2.17: 233-4.

What Has Government Done to Our Money?

Book by Murray Rothbard, preface by Guido Hülsmann

I can name maybe half a dozen books (including the Bible) which have been pivotal to my intellectual development. What Has Government Done to Our Money, by Murray N. Rothbard, is one of them. Here‘s the Wikipedia page on the book.

I cite in the following excerpts from the preface by Professor Jörg Guido Hülsmann.

What Has Government Done to Our Money? is an outstanding example of Rothbard’s creative mind at work. Since it was first published in 1964 .[sic! Wikipedia and other sources say 1963], it has appeared in four editions in English, and has been translated into many foreign languages. It has served as a primer on monetary theory for all its readers. In fact, it is probably the most brilliant introduction to monetary theory ever written, presenting both the foundation of monetary theory and exploring the role of the state in the degeneration of monetary systems. The book is suitable not only for economists, but also for non-academics and all people interested in the subject. It is, like all of Rothbard’s works, a timeless and powerful statement. It leaves the reader with a completely new way to think about the relationship between money and state.

Here the elements and the functions of a free monetary system are presented with brevity and clarity. Rothbard shows how and why gold and silver are used as money on the unhampered market. Money originates neither from social compact nor government edict, but as a market solution of the problems and costs associated with barter. All other tasks usually considered monetary duties of the state — from minting to the definition of the monetary units to the precise form money will take — are left to private entrepreneurs on the unhampered market.

Where is the place of the state in this picture? Doesn’t the state have to guard our money? Doesn’t it have to adjust the money supply and supervise the banks? Rothbard’s answer to these questions is a clear no. Government intervention does not protect money at all but rather threatens its integrity. Government interference leads to more abuse and more instability than the free market would otherwise have tolerated. Instead of solving problems, intervention creates them. Instead of order they bring chaos and economic upheaval.

For Rothbard, the central issue is not whether monetary policy should stabilize the price level or the money supply; it is whether there is a role for the state in the monetary system at all. On this question, Rothbard answers decisively in the negative. Entrusting the money to the state is a grave error. It opens door and gate for totalitarian control of the society by interest groups closely connected to the state apparatus. The consequences are economic and monetary crises, and a relentless decline in the purchasing power of money. Rothbard illustrates this impressively with a short history of the monetary collapse of the West.

Rothbard’s chronicle of decline ends with the breakdown of Bretton Woods and a prediction that the future portends continued exchange-rate volatility, debt accumulation, inflation, crises, bailouts, and a political drive to further centralize control of money and credit. This prediction turned out to be a good summary of the monetary events of the last quarter century. The world economy adopted a de facto dollar standard, a managed monetary integration came to Europe, and crisis has followed crisis in Asia, Russia, Mexico, and Central and South America, along with exploding deficits and debts in the United States. Undoubtedly many more will come our way.

This new edition includes a detailed reform proposal for a 100% gold dollar [see online here], an essay first published in 1962, the same year that Man, Economy, and State appeared and two years before What Has Government Done to Our Money. That it was written a decade before the last vestiges of the gold standard were abolished does not diminish its power as a proposal for reform.

Would Rothbard’s plan work? Certainly. The limits are due not to its economic viability but rather to the same forces that keep all radical proposals for freedom at bay: political barriers and ideological opposition. Should the conditions ever become ripe for pure liberty again — and Rothbard was ever the optimist — this essay will serve as an outstanding blueprint.

Today all nations face a choice between sound money and continuing monetary depreciation and/or monetary crisis. Sound money, Rothbard shows, means the enforcement of strict separation between the state and money. Rothbard has shown that the world’s party of liberty can embrace what is usually said to be an impossible ideal: an international money protected against the arbitrariness of the state. His analysis and prescriptions deserve even more attention today than when they were first written.

Jörg Guido Hülsmann

Angers, France

April 2005

What led to the Decline of the West

In this article, I find the following paragraphs:

The 1970s and 1980s were the point at which the long arc of traditional liberalism gave place to an avowedly illiberal, mechanical ‘control system’ (managerial technocracy) that today fraudulently poses as liberal democracy.

Emmanuel Todd, the French anthropological historian, examines the longer dynamics to events unfolding in the present: The prime agent of change leading to the Decline of the West (La Défaite de l’Occident), he argues, was the implosion of ‘Anglo’ Protestantism in the U.S. (and England), with its entailed habits of work, individualism and industry – a creed whose qualities were held then to reflect God’s grace through material success, and, above all, to confirm membership of the divine ‘Elect’.

Whereas traditional liberalism had its mores, the decline of traditional values triggered the slide towards managerial technocracy, and to nihilism. Religion lingers on in the West, though in a ‘zombie’ state, Todd avers. Such societies, he argues, flounder – absent some guiding metaphysical sphere that provides people with non-material sustenance.

It’s a bit strange: The author (Alastair Crooke) points to Todd’s hypothesis of “‘Anglo’ Protestantism” being the “prime agent of the Decline of the West”, but in the following paragraph mentions “the decline of traditional values”. It’s not clear from the article whether the latter statement is Crooke’s or Todd’s.

In any case, I would contend that Protestantism (not ‘Anglo’, but ‘Calvinistic’, e.g. Puritanism) indeed “entailed habits of work, individualism and industry – a creed whose qualities were held then to reflect God’s grace through material success”, this actually being good things. It led to the Industrial Revolution and so to the blessing of drastically reduced infant mortality and better quality of life for nearly everyone.

The other part of that sentence, namely “above all, to confirm membership of the divine ‘Elect’” indeed points to something more problematic. It’s true and will have led, due to human fallibility, to “elitist” attitudes. However, in a healthy Christian environment such attitudes would have been tempered by the commandment to “love thy neighbour as yourself”.

The loss of the faith in God led to the loss of the power of this commandment within society and therefore to “the decline of traditional values”.

So, it’s not “Protestantism” – of any flavour – that led to the “Decline of the West”, but the loss of faith.

What was retained was the belief in the ability to be somehow part of an “elect” group who are somehow “better” than most other people and therefor have a right to lord it over them – uninhibited by divine commandments.

That attitude led to fiat money, the welfare state, state schooling, both World Wars and the subsequent “Decline of the West”.

Socialism’s Very Quiet Revolution is Already Causing Chaos in the West

From Howard Kunstler’s recent article: “If Wishes Were Fishes“:

The failures of each giant system will only amplify and ramify the failures in all the other systems. Take that as axiomatic. For instance, the fantastic failures in higher education now on display, largely due to the Marxian defeat of excellence, will implant a generation of incompetents in all hierarchies of management. That will result in an insidious matrix of bad decision-making. The Pareto 80-20 principle will ensure that 80-percent of all institutional energy will focus on propping up failing institutions with bad decisions that add up to broken business models (while 20-percent goes into actually carrying-out the bad decisions as policy). That explains how Pete Buttigieg’s Department of Transportation spent $7.5-billion to build seven electric car charging stations.

From Wanjiru Njoya’s recent article “Socialism’s Very Quiet Revolution“:

The quiet nature of this revolution means that great optimism surrounds the banning of schemes and programs such as DEI, and many fail to notice that such bans do not capture the relentless “great tides of thought and appetite that run unseen deeply below the surface” to which Flynn referred. Thus, we see DEI offices being shut down and DEI staff reassigned to other offices to continue their work albeit without referring to it as DEI.

[. . .]

The lesson to derive from Flynn is that citizens unaware of an unfolding revolution are easily “sneaked into socialism.” Conservatives are now rejoicing at “winning” their battle to quash DEI programs, while the DEI enforcers simply slap a new label on their schemes and carry on. Being unaware of the scale of the threat, citizens fail to take effective action and are eventually “trapped in a socialist system.” A good example of how a country can become trapped is when decades of case law and legal precedent become difficult to reverse. Constitutional concepts over time acquire the meaning assigned to them by the courts, which are then entrenched in law schools and courts as the “correct” meaning. In this situation, the people’s optimism becomes their weakness.

How the Bible influenced the Founding Fathers

Which political traditions and thinkers shaped the ideas and aspirations of the American founding? Late eighteenth-century Americans were influenced by diverse perspectives, including British constitutionalism, classical and civic republicanism, and Enlightenment liberalism. Among the works frequently said to have influenced the founders are John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, and William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England.

Another, often overlooked or discounted source of influence is the Bible. Its expansive influence on the political culture of the age should not surprise us because the population was overwhelming Protestant, and it informed significant aspects of public culture, including language, letters, education, and law. No book at the time was more accessible or familiar than the English Bible, specifically the King James Bible. And the people were biblically literate.

Continue reading here.

New Survey: Fewer Germans feel free to express their political opinions in 2023

. . . than in any year since the early days of the Federal Republic

Article by eugyppius.

Excerpt:

The impression of a closed and stifling discourse is present across the political spectrum. Only 39% of centre-right CDU voters feel free to express their views, but for Die Linke, or the Left Party (the successors of the East German SED), that number falls to 36%, and for AfD voters it is lowest of all, a mere 11%. A clear majority (75%) of Greens alone feel that they can speak their minds, and so here we learn who feels best represented by our present discourse.

“Do you have the feeling, that you can freely express your political opinion today in Germany, or is it better to be cautious?” Blue: “I can speak freely.” Orange: “It is better to be cautious.”

No surprises lurk in the breakdown by education: 51% of those with university degrees or an Abitur feel their political expression is unhampered, while clear majorities of everybody else say they cannot speak their minds.

The historical perspective is sobering. The Federal Republic was only five years old in 1953; the Allied occupation and denazification were recent events, and even then Germans enjoyed a substantially greater subjective sense of political expression than they do today. This sense peaked under Willy Brandt during the Cold War, but has been in a state of decay since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. This would be good evidence in favour of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s thesis, that Western liberal states rapidly lose their enthusiasm for principles like free expression in the absence of competition from rival systems.

Yet it was not the end of the Cold War, but rather the chancellorship of Angela Merkel that saw the most dramatic decline in free political expression. Specifically, Merkel’s strategy of “asymmetric demobilisation,” via which she sought to disarm the leftist opposition by adopting central elements of their political programme, had a very perverse influence. German voters and hence the politicians who appeal to them have always had pronounced conservative tendencies, while the media here as everywhere else lean to the left. Before 2005, politicians provided an important counterweight to the line taken by our press, but Merkel’s triangulations created a new system of soft political enforcement sustained by establishment politicians and mainstream journalism alike.

The consequence is a system that has placed all of us in thrall to the whims of an eccentric minority. The opinions which govern German society, as I’ve written many times before, are not those of most people, but rather of an increasingly insular, university-educated urbanite class, who are relatively affluent, who vote overwhelmingly Green and who constitute no more than 15% of the population. I doubt the old socialist countries of the Warsaw Pact were any different in this respect. More and more, it feels like we defeated communism only to recreate an equivalent system, which threatens to be much worse, insofar as its informal nature and soft asymmetrical methods confuse everybody and thwart opposition.